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Abstract. Designated verifier signatures (DVS) allow a signer to create
a signature whose validity can only be verified by a specific entity chosen
by the signer. In addition, the chosen entity, known as the designated
verifier, cannot convince any body that the signature is created by the
signer. Multi-designated verifiers signatures (MDVS) are a natural exten-
sion of DVS in which the signer can choose multiple designated verifiers.
DVS and MDVS are useful primitives in electronic voting and contract
signing. In this paper, we investigate various aspects of MDVS and make
two contributions. Firstly, we revisit the notion of unforgeability under
rogue key attack on MDVS. In this attack scenario, a malicious desig-
nated verifier tries to forge a signature that passes through the verifica-
tion of another honest designated verifier. A common counter-measure in-
volves making the knowledge of secret key assumption (KOSK) in which
an adversary is required to produce a proof-of-knowledge of the secret
key. We strengthened the existing security model to capture this attack
and propose a new construction that does not rely on the KOSK as-
sumption. Secondly, we propose a generic construction of strong MDVS.
1 Introduction
Designated verifier signatures/proofs (DVS/DVP) were introduced by Jakobs-
son, Sako and Impagliazzo [12], and independently by Chaum [6] in 1996. A DVS
scheme allows a signer Alice to convince a designated verifier Bob that Alice has
endorsed the message while Bob cannot transfer this conviction to anyone else.
The underlying principle of DVS is that a signature is a non-interactive proof
that asserts the validity of the statement “Alice has endorsed a message” or “the
signer has Bob’s secret key”. While Bob is convinced that Alice has endorsed
the message, he cannot convince Carol as the proof could have been produced
by Bob himself. In the same paper, Jakobsson et al. introduce the concept of
strong DVS (SDVS) in which the private key of Bob is required to verify the
signature. Recall that DVS itself discloses the information that the signature
is produced by Alice or Bob. If an external party, Carol, is confident that Bob
has not created the signature, she knows Alice has endorsed the message. An
example is that the signature is captured by Carol before it reaches Bob. This
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requirement is formalized as privacy of signer’s identity in [19]. It is required
that without Bob’s private key, Carol cannot tell if a signature is created by
Alice or another signer.
In [12], the concept of multiple verifiers has been discussed and in the rump
session of Crypto’03, Desmedt [10] proposed the notion of multi-designated ver-
ifiers signatures (MDVS) as a generalization of DVS. It was later formalized
in [14]. Since then, a number of MDVS constructions [12, 14, 17, 20, 7, 15, 16, 8,
24, 5, 22, 23] with different features in different settings have been proposed. In-
terested readers may refer to [23] for a survey.
The problem of rogue key attack in DVS was first discussed in [12]. In the
discussion, the goal of a malicious verifier Bob is to convince an external party
Carol that the signer Alice has endorsed the message. For example, Bob can
create his public key as the output of a hash function using a random number
as input. Later, when Bob reveals the value of the random number, everyone
will be convinced that the signatures must have been created by Alice. One of
the counter-measures suggested is to require Bob to prove the knowledge of his
secret key. Another type of rogue key attack specifically targeting MDVS was
discussed in [21]. In this attack, a malicious verifier Carol creates her public key
as a function of other honest verifiers’ public keys so that she could create a
signature that passes the verification of other honest verifiers. Again, the sug-
gested counter-measure is to require the verifier to prove the knowledge of her
secret key. Note that no formal model has been proposed to capture the attack.
We remark that the two types of rogue key attacks are different in nature. The
former is against non-transferability while the latter is against unforgeability. In
this paper, our focus is on the latter.
As discussed, a counter-measure against rogue key attack in MDVS is to
require the adversary to produce a proof-of-knowledge of the secret key. In prac-
tice, this implies all users would have to produce a proof-of-knowledge of the
secret key to the certification authority (CA) before the CA certifies the corre-
sponding public key. This solution requires a change in the current PKI and is
regarded as costly [2]. Thus, it is desirable to design MDVS secure against rogue
key attack in the plain model. In respond to this, we provide a partial solution
by proposing the first MDVS scheme that is formally proven unforgeable under
rogue key attack.
It is known that if we encrypt the DVS under the designated verifier’s public
key, the resulting scheme would be a strong DVS. Nonetheless, a subtle issue
discussed in [14] prevent such generic transformation to be applicable to the
case of MDVS. Specifically, the challenge is to ensure correctness of the resulting
scheme since it is entirely possible for a signer to encrypt different values under
different designated verifier’s public key so that a signature could be regarded
as valid by some of the designated verifiers only. We tackle this issue with an
hybrid encryption using a simple one-way secure encryption and a symmetric
encryption and show that the unforgeability under rogue key attack is preserved
in our generic transformation. Specifically, we make the following contributions.
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1.1 Contribution.
1. We present a formal definition for MDVS that captures existential forgery
under rogue key attack.
2. We propose a construction that is provably secure against rogue key attack
in our model.
3. We present a generic construction of strong MDVS secure against rogue key
attack.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
review the syntax of a MDVS scheme and its security definitions. We discuss the
rogue key attack on MDVS, its formal definition and our proposed solution in
Section 3. In Section 4, we present a generic construction of strong MDVS. We
conclude our paper in Section 5.
2 Preliminary
If n is a positive integer, we use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}. We review the
following well-known computational assumptions.
Definition 1 (DL Assumption). Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime order
p. The discrete logarithm assumption states that given a tuple (g, Z) ∈ (G,G),
it is computationally infeasible to compute the value z ∈ Zp such that Z = gz.
Definition 2 (CDH Assumption). Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime
order p. The computational Diffie-Hellman assumption states that given a tuple
(g, ga, gb) ∈ (G,G,G), it is computationally infeasible to compute the value gab.
2.1 Syntax
We adapt the definitions and security models of MDVS from various litera-
tures [14, 15]. A MDVS scheme consists of four algorithms, namely, Setup, Gen,
Sign, Verify, whose functions are enumerated below.
param ← Setup(1λ): On input a security parameter λ, this algorithm outputs
the public parameter param for the system. Note that this algorithm is op-
tional if all users could generate their key pairs without any coordination.
Nonetheless, to the best of our knowledge, all existing schemes requires the
users to create their keys based on some commonly known system parame-
ters. We assume param is an implicit input to all algorithms listed below.
(pk, sk) ← Gen(): This algorithm outputs a key pair (pk, sk) for a user (who can
take the role of a signer or a designated verifier). If (pk, sk) is an output of
the algorithm Gen(), we say pk is the corresponding public key of sk (and
vice versa).
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(σ,V) ← Sign(skS ,V,m) : On input a message m, a secret key of a signer skS
(whose public key is pkS) and a set of designated verifiers’ public keys V,
this algorithm outputs a signature σ, which is a designated verifier signature
of m with respect to the public key pkS .
valid/invalid ← Verify(pkS , σ,V,m, skV ) : On input a public key pkS , a mes-
sage m, a signature σ with a set of designated verifiers’ public keys V and
a private key skV such that the corresponding public key pkV ∈ V, this
algorithm verifies the signature and outputs valid/invalid.
A MDVS scheme must possess Correctness, Unforgeability and Source-Hiding,
to be reviewed below.
Correctness. For any security parameter λ and param ← Setup(1λ), (pkS , skS) ←
Gen() and V = {pkV1 , . . ., pkVn} such that (pkVi , skVi) ← Gen() for i ∈ [n] . For
any message m, if (σ,V) ← Sign(skS ,V,m), then valid ← Verify(pkS , σ, V, m,
skVi) for all i ∈ [n]. Furthermore, for any values σ, V, m, pkS , if there exists
a private key skV such that its corresponding public key pkV ∈ V and that
valid ← Verify(pkS , σ, V, m, skV ), then for any private key skV ′ , it holds that
valid ← Verify(pkS , σ, V, m, skV ′) if the corresponding public key pkV ′ ∈ V.
Unforgeability. The following game between a challenger C and an adversary A
formally captures the requirement of Unforgeability.
Setup C invokes Setup(1λ) and subsequently Gen() to obtain (param, (pkS , skS),
{(pkVi , skVi)}i∈[n]). Denote the set {pkVi}i∈[n] by V. (param, pkS ,V) is given
to A.
Query A is allowed to make the following queries:
– Corruption Query. A submits a public key pkV ∈ V and receives skV .
– Signature Query.A submits a messagem and receives (σ, V) ← Sign(skS ,
V, m).
Output A submits (σ∗,m∗) and wins if and only if
1. There exists a public key pkV ∗ ∈ V such that valid ← Verify(pkS , σ∗,
V, m∗, skV ∗).
2. A has not submitted a Signature Query with input m∗.
3. There exists a public key pkV ∈ V such that A has not submitted a
Corruption Query as input.
Definition 3 (Unforgeability). A MDVS scheme is unforgeable if no PPT
adversary wins the above game with non-negligible probability.
As stated in [14], the adversary is not given an oracle for signature verification
as he can verify any signatures by corrupting some of the verifiers.
Source hiding. It means that given a message m and a signature (σ,V), it is
infeasible to determine who from the original signer or the designated verifiers
all together created the signature, even if all the secret keys are known. The
formal definition is adapted from Definition 3 of [11] for normal DVS into that
for MDVS.
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Definition 4 (Source Hiding). A MDVS scheme is source hiding if there ex-
ists a PPT simulation algorithm Sim that on input a public key pkS, a set of
key pairs (pkVi , skVi)i∈[n] and a message m, outputs a tuple (σ,V) (such thatV = {pkVi}i∈[n]) that is indistinguishale to (σ,V) ← Sign(skS ,V,m) (where
skS is the corresponding private key of pkS). In other words, for all PPT algo-
rithmn D, for any security parameter λ, param ← Setup(1λ), (pkS , skS) ← Gen(),
{(pkVi , skVi) ← Gen()}i∈[n] and any message m, it holds that:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pr
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
(σ0,V) ← Sign(skS ,V,m)
(σ1,V) ← Sim(pkS , {pkVi , skVi}i∈[n],m)
b ∈R {0, 1}
b′ ← D(σb, pkS , skS , {pkVi , skVi}i∈[n],m)
: b = b′
⎤
⎥⎥⎦− 1/2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= negl(λ)
where negl(λ) represents a negligible function in λ. A function negl(λ) is said to
be negligible in λ if for all polynomial q(·), there exists a value k0 such that for
every λ > k0, negl(λ) < 1/q(λ).
2.2 Strong Multi-Designated Verifiers Signatures
Strong Multi-Designated Verifiers Signatures. It is desirable in many scenarios
that, besides the signer and the verifier, a third party cannot tell if a signature
for the verifier is created by that particular signer or by someone else. This
concept appeared in [12] and is formally defined as privacy of signer’s identity
(PSI) in [13]. This applies to the case of multiple designated verifiers and the
property PSI for MDVS is defined in [14].
Privacy of signer’s identity. The following game between a challenger C and an
adversary A formally captures the requirement of PSI.
Setup C invokes Setup(1λ) and subsequently Gen() to obtain (param, (pkS0 ,
skS0), (pkS1 , skS1), {(pkVi , skVi)}i∈[n]). Denote the set {pkVi}i∈[n] by V.
(param, pkS0 , pkS1 , V) is given to A.
Query A is allowed to make the following queries:
– Verification Query. A submits (m,σ,V, pkSc : c ∈ {0, 1}, V ∈ V) and
receives valid/invalid ← Verify(pkSc , σ,V ∪ pkV ,m, skV ).
– Signature Query. A submits a message m, a bit b and receives (σ, V) ←
Sign(skSb , V, m).
Challenge At some point A submits a message m∗. C flips a fair coin b and
returns (σ∗, V) ← Sign(skSb , V, m).
Query A continues to make verification and signature queries.
Output A submits a bit b′ and wins if and only if b′ = b.
A’s advantage in the game PSI is defined as the probability that A wins the
game minus 1/2.
Definition 5 (Privacy of signer’s identity). A MDVS scheme is said to
possess privacy of signer’s identity if no PPT adversary has non-negligible ad-
vantage in game PSI.
A strong MDVS scheme is a MDVS scheme that possesses privacy of signer’s
identity.
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3 Rouge Key Attack in MDVS and its Solution
We first review the generic construction of MDVS from discrete logarithm-based
ring signatures [14]. In the next subsection, we describe how a malicious desig-
nated verifier could launch a rogue key attack to make an honest verifier into
accepting a forged signature. We stress that this attack is outside the original
security model and does not imply the scheme is insecure. Rather, we would like
to show that a signature that passes the verification of a particular honest des-
ignated verifier could have been created by a real signer or some other malicious
verifiers. Finally, we propose a fix.
3.1 Generic Construction of MDVS [14]
The generic construction utilizes ring signatures as building blocks and requires
that all the keys are discrete logarithm-based. Readers are referred to [18] for the
formal definition of a ring signature scheme. Roughly speaking, a ring signature
is a signature created from one of the possible signers in a set of signers (often
called a ring of signers). The ring of signers are created in an ad-hoc manner by
the actual signer. The formation is spontaneous in that the members can be com-
pletely unaware of being conscripted into the ring. In the generic construction
of MDVS, ring signatures supporting a ring size of 2 is required.
– Setup. This is equivalent to the parameter generation of the ring signature
scheme (if any).
– Gen. This is equivalent to the key generation of the ring signature scheme.
The generic construction requires the key of the ring signature to be of the
form (gx, x) where g is included in the parameter, x is the signing key and
gx is the corresponding public key.
– Sign. Let the signer’s key pair be (gxS , xS) and the set of designated veri-
fiers’ key pairs be {(gxVi , xVi)} for i = 1 to n. The signer computes gXV =∏
i∈[n] g
xVi . Next, the signer creates a ring signature on message m on the
ring {gxS , gxV } using the secret key xS . Denote the output as σ. This value,
together with the set {gxVi }i∈[n], is outputted as the multi-designated verifier
signature.
– Verify. To verify the signature (σ, {gxVi }i∈[n]) on message m, a verifier com-
putes gXV =
∏
i∈[n] g
xVi . Then it employs the verification algorithm of the
ring signature scheme on the ring {gXS , gXV }.
The unforgeability property comes from the fact that to create a ring signa-
ture on the ring {gxS , gxV }, one needs to know xS or xV . Since the adversary
does not know xS or xV
1, forging a signature implies breaking the unforgeability
of the underlying ring signature scheme. On the other hand, the source hiding
property comes from the fact that if all secret keys of the verifiers are known,
one can construct a PPT Sim which computes xV =
∑
i∈[n] xVi and uses it to
1 Since the adversary cannot corrupt all the verifiers, it does not know the value xV ,
which is equal to
∑
i∈[n] xVi .
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create a ring signature on behalf of the ring {gxS , gxV }. Due to the anonymity
of ring signature, no PPT algorithm can distinguish a signature created by the
real signer using xS or by Sim using xV .
3.2 Rouge Key Attack and Its Defence
Existential Forgery under Rouge Key Attack. Rouge key attack against a con-
crete scheme in [14] has been discussed in [21]. Here we extend the attack to the
generic construction of [14]. Suppose an adversary’s goal is to convince an honest
designated verifier into accepting a forged signature. Let gxS , gxV ′ be the pub-
lic keys of the targeted signer and designated verifier respectively. To cheat the
verifier, the adversary randomly generates a value xA and crafts a mal-formed
public key K = gxA/gxV ′ . Next, the adversary computes gxV = KgxV ′ = gxA .
Since the adversary is in possession of xA, he can create a ring signature on
the ring {gxS , gxV }. He outputs the signature, together with the set of desig-
nated verifiers as {gxV ′ ,K}. Consequently, the designated verifier would accept
a forged signature created by the adversary instead of the signer. We denote
attack of this kind as forgery against rogue key attack (RKA).
A Proposed Fix. The problem comes from the extra power given to the adver-
sary to create malformed public key. The fix suggest in [21] is to require the
certification authority to check the validity of the public key before issuing a
digital certificate. In terms of modelling, this implies the stronger certified key
model in which the users are required to conduct a proof-of-knowledge of his
secret key to the CA. As argue in [2], this requires modification of the client
and CA functioning software. We propose another way that could withstand
this attack in the plain model based on a technique used in multisignautres [2]
and batch verification of digital signatures [1]. In a nutshell, gxV is defined to
be
∏
i∈[n](g
xVi )hi , where hi = H(g
xS , gxV1 , . . . , gxVn ,m, i) for a hash function H
which shall be modelled as a random oracle. Observe that with this modification,
the value xV can still be computed if all the values xVi are known. On the other
hand, if one of the secret keys, say xVi , is unknown, the value xV cannot be
computed since the probability of “canceling” gxVi in the computation of gxV is
negligible assuming the values hi are randomly distributed and are only known
after the value of the public keys are chosen.
3.3 Formal Security Definition for Unforgeability Under Rogue Key
Attack
To formally assert the security of our proposed solution, we define a security
model which intends to capture attack of this kind.2We believe a verification
query with the target verifier may be of use to the adversary since the adversary
might try to submit mal-formed signatures to learn information about the target
verifier’s verification procedure.
2 While rogue key attack on MDVS is discussed in [21], no formal security model has
been proposed to capture such an attack.
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Unforgeability Against Rogue Key Attack. The following game between a chal-
lenger C and an adversary A formally captures the requirement of UF-RKA
Setup C invokes Setup(1λ) and subsequently Gen() to obtain (param, (pkS , skS),
(pkV , skV ). (param, pkS , pkV ) is given to A.
Query A is allowed to make the following queries:
– Verification Query. A submits a set of public keys V, a signature (σ,V ∪
pkV ), a message m and receives valid/invalid ← Verify(pkS , σ,V ∪
pkV ,m, skV ).
– Signature Query. A submits a message m, a set of public keys V and
receives (σ,V) ← (skS ,V,m). Note that A can submit an arbitrary set
of verifiers of his choice (even a set without pkV ).
Output A submits (σ∗,m∗) and a set of public keys V∗ and wins if and only if
1. valid ← Verify(pkS , σ∗, V∗ ∪ pkV , m∗, skV ).
2. A has not submitted a Signature Query with input (m∗,V∗ ∪ pkV ).
Definition 6 (UF-RKA). A MDVS scheme is unforgeable under rogue key
attack if no PPT adversary wins the above game with non-negligible probability.
We believe UF-RKA for MDVS is a stronger notion compared with the notion
Unforgeability.
3.4 A Concrete Construction
We present a concrete MDVS scheme from a commonly used two-party ring
signature following the generic construction together with our proposed fix.
– Setup. Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime order p. Output param as
(G, p, g).
– Gen. Choose a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp which will be modelled as
a random oracle3. Randomly generate x ∈R Zp, compute gx. Output pk as
(gx, H) and sk as x.
– Sign. On input the signer’s key pair (pkS , skS), a set of designated verifier’s
public keys V = {pkV1 , . . . , pkVn} and a message m, parse pkS as (YS , HS),
skS as xS , pkVi as (YVi , HVi). Compute Y =
∏
i∈[n] Y
hi
Vi
where hi = HVi(pkS ,
pkV1 , . . ., pkVn , m).
1. Randomly generate r, c2, z2 ∈ Zp, compute T1 = gr, T2 = Y c2gz2 .
2. Compute c = HS(T1, T2, pkS , pkV1 , h1, . . ., pkVn , hn, Y , m) and c1 =
c− c2.
3. Compute z1 = r − c1xS .
Output the signature as (c1, c2, z1, z2,V). Note that (c1, c2, z1, z2) is a ring
signature on message m with respective to ring {YS , Y }.
3 We abuse the notation and assume a full domain hash. In the following when we
write c = H(X,Y ) where X and Y may be elements from different domains, we
assume a suitable encoding scheme is employed to convert X,Y into a bit-string.
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– We remark that the above steps constitute a standard signature proof-of-
knowledge of 1-out-of-2 discrete logarithms (which can be viewed as a two-
party ring signature). This can be presented as follows using the Camenisch
and Stadler notation [4].
SPK {(α) : YS = gα ∨ Y = gα} (m)
– Verify. To verify the signature (c1, c2, z1, z2, {pkVi}i∈[n]) on messagem, a veri-
fier parses pkVi as (YVi , HVi) and computes Y =
∏
i∈[n] Y
HVi (pkS ,pkV1 ,...,pkVn ,m)
Vi
.
Output valid if and only if
c1 + c2 = HS
(
Y c1S g
z1 , Y c2gz2 , pkS , pkV1 , h1, . . . , pkVn , hn, Y,m
)
and invalid otherwise.
Regarding the security of our concrete construction, we have the following
theorem, whose proof shall appear in the full version of the paper due to page
limitation.
Theorem 1. Our concrete construction is secure under the discrete logarithm
assumption in the random oracle model. Specifically, it satisfies
– definition 3 under the discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle
model;
– definition 4 unconditionally;
– definition 6 under the discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle
model.
4 Generic Strong MDVS
Strong DVS can be constructed from DVS via encrypting the signature under
the designated verifier’s public key. However, the intuitive solution of encrypting
the signature under each designated verifier’s public key in the case of multiple
designated verifiers is not satisfactory. As discussed in [14], this intuitive solution
creates a subtle issue in correctness. Specifically, if some of the encryptions are
not executed properly, the signer could create an “invalid” signature that would
be regarded as valid by some verifiers.
4.1 Overview of Our Generic Construction
To tackle this challenge, we observe that it is straightforward to use a verifiable
encryption [3] which allows the signer to create a proof that all ciphertext de-
crypts to the same value. By verifying the proof, all verifiers are assured that all
the verifiers obtains the same value for signature verification. This solution is,
however, expensive. Looking at an abstract level, the goal of this encryption is to
ensure all verifiers obtains the same value via decryption. This can be achieved,
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perhaps somewhat interestingly, using a very weak one-way encryption with an
explicit “IND-CPA” attack. Denote such an encryption scheme as WE . That is,
given a message k, anyone can check if the ciphertext C decrypts to it. It is
easy for a verifier to check locally if all the encryptions of the designated verifier
signature are properly done.
This creates another problem. Since WE is only one-way secure, the cipher-
text might leak information about the signature being encrypted and thus pri-
vacy of signer’s identity is not guaranteed. Thus, we employ a hybrid approach.
WE is used to encrypt a symmetric key k under all the designated verifiers pub-
lic keys into ciphertexts C1, . . ., Cn. The ordinary MDVS is encrypted with a
symmetric key encryption SE with key k. As long as the key k cannot be recov-
ered from the ciphertext Ci’s, no information about the MDVS can be learnt as
long as the symmetric encryption SE is secure. Looking ahead, we assume SE
to be an idealized cipher for the ease of security analysis. This means that our
generic construction is secure in the ideal cipher model, which is equivalent to
the random oracle model due to the result of [9].
4.2 Building Block of Our Generic Construction
While conceptually simple, two properties regarding WE are needed. The first
one is an efficient and explicit “IND-CPA” attack. The second one is an efficient
and explicit malleability attack which allows anyone to transform a ciphertext
C under public key Y into another ciphertext C ′ under public key Y ′ so that
they are encrypting the same message. The malleability attack on WE is needed
in the proof of security for multiple designated verifiers.
Below we define the requirement of the weakly secure encryption WE as
follows.
– paramWE ← WE .Setup(1λ): On input a security parameter λ, this algorithm
outputs the public parameter paramWE for the system. We assume paramWE
is an implicit input to all algorithms listed below.
– (WE .pk, WE .sk) ← WE .Gen(): This algorithm outputs a key pair (WE .pk,
WE .sk).
– CWE ← WE .Enc(WE .pk,m) : On input a message m and a public key of the
receiver WE .pk, this algorithm outputs the ciphertext CWE .
– m ← WE .Dec(WE .sk, CWE) : On input a secret key WE .sk, a ciphertext
CWE , this algorithm outputs the plaintext m.
– 0/1 ← WE .iAtk(WE .pk, CWE ,m) : This is an attack on indistinguishability
of ciphertext. On input a public keyWE .pk, a ciphertext CWE and a plaintext
m, output 1 if and only if m = WE .Dec(WE .sk, CWE), where WE .sk is the
corresponding private key of WE .pk and 0 otherwise. Note that WE .sk is not
an input to this algorithm.
– (C ′WE ,WE .pk′) ← WE .mAtk(WE .pk, CWE) : This is an attack on malleabil-
ity of ciphertext. On input a public key WE .pk, a ciphertext CWE , output
C ′WE , WE .pk′ such that the distribution of C ′WE is indistinguishable to that
of WE .Enc(WE .pk′, WE .Dec(WE .sk, CWE)). Note that the algorithm does
not output the corresponding secret key for WE .pk′.
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We require the one-way security of WE , which is formally defined as the
following game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Setup C invokes Setup(1λ) and subsequently Gen() to obtain (paramWE , WE .pk,
WE .sk).
Challenge C picks a random messagem, compute CWE ← WE .Enc(WE .pk,m).
(paramWE , WE .pk, CWE) is given to A.
Output A outputs m′ and win if and only if m = m′.
WE is one-way secure if no PPT adversary A wins the above game with
non-negligible probability.
We propose a construction ofWE based on the Elgamal encryption in a cyclic
group equipped with a bilinear map.
– WE .Setup(1λ): Generate a pair of groups G,GT of the same prime order p
of λ-bit and a bilinear map ê : G×G → GT . Let g be a generator of G. Set
paramWE = (G,GT , p, g, ê).
– WE .Gen(): Randomly pick u ∈R Zp, compute U = gu. Set (WE .pk,WE .sk) =
(U, u).
– WE .Enc(U,m) : On input a message m ∈ G, randomly generate r ∈R Zp,
output CWE = (C,D) as (mUr, gr).
– WE .Dec(u, (C,D)) : Output C/Du.
– WE .iAtk(U, (C,D),m) : Output 1 if and only if
ê(C/m, g) = (D,U)
and 0 otherwise.
– WE .mAtk(U, (C,D)) : Randomly pick e, f ∈R Zp, compute U ′ = Uge. Com-
pute C̃ = CDe, C ′ = C̃U ′f , D′ = Dgf . Output
(
(C ′, D′), U ′
)
.
Note that if U = gu, C = mUr, D = gr, it is easy to see that C ′ =
m(Uge)r+f , D′ = gr+f and U ′ = Uge. Thus, (C ′, D′) is encrypting the mes-
sage m under the public key U ′ with the correct distribution.
Next, we show that our construction of WE is one-way secure under the
computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that can win the game one-way
security, we show how to construction an algorithm S that solves the CDH
problem in a group equipped with a bilinear map. S is given (G,GT , ê, p, g, ga, gb)
and its goal is to output gab.
S randomly picks a value C, gives paramWE = (G,GT , p, g, ê), U = ga,
(C,D) = (C, gb) to A. Note that this implicit set the message being encrypted
as m = C/gab. A returns with a value m′. S computes C/m′ and outputs it as
the solution to the CDH problem. 	
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4.3 Our Generic Construction of Strong MDVS
We present our generic construction of Strong MDVS. Let MS = (MS.Setup,
MS.Gen,MS.Sign,MS.Verify) be a secure MDVS scheme. LetWE = (WE .Setup,
WE .Gen, WE .Enc, WE .Dec, WE .iAtk, WE .mAtk) be a one-way secure encryp-
tion. Let H be a hash function and SE be a symmetric key encryption. We
use SE .Enck and SE .Deck to denote encryption and decryption operation of SE
using key k. H, SE will be modelled as a random oracle and an ideal cipher
respectively. We show how to construct a strong MDVS scheme (Setup, Gen,
Sign, Verify) as follows.
– Setup. On input security parameter 1λ, invoke paramMS ← MS.Setup(1λ)
and paramWE ← WE .Setup(1λ), specify a weak encryption WE , a hash func-
tion H and a symmetric cipher SE . Set param = (paramMS , paramWE , H,
SE).
– Gen. Invoke (MS.pk, MS.sk) ← MS.Gen(), (WE .pk,WE .sk) ← WE .Gen().
Output pk = (MS.pk, WE .pk) and sk = (MS.sk, WE .sk).
– Sign. Let pkS = (MS.pkS ,WE .pkS) and skS = (MS.skS ,WE .skS) be the
key pair of the signer. Let m be the message to be signed. Parse the set of
verifiers to be V = {pkV1 , . . . , pkVn} such that pkVi = (MS.pki,WE .pki).
Denote by VMS the set {MS.pk1, . . . ,MS.pkn}.
The signer randomly picks k ∈R {0, 1}λ. For i = 1 to n, compute
Ci = WE .Enc(WE .pki, k)
Next, compute τ = H(pkS , pkV1 , C1, . . . , pkVn , Cn,m). Invoke (σMS , VMS)← Sign(MS.skS , VMS , m||τ). Invoke E = SE .Enck(σMS ||τ ||pkS).
Output the signature as (E,V, {Ci}i∈[n]).
– Verify. To verify a signature (E, V, {Ci}i∈[n]) on message m, a verifier V
parses pkVi as (MS.pki, WE .pki) for all pkVi ∈ V and uses his secret key
(MS.skV , WE .skV ) as follows.
• Locate the index i such that pkV = pkVi . Use his secret key to compute
k = VE .Dec(Ci, WE .skV ).
• For all j ∈ [n]\{i}, check if 1 = WE .iAtk(WE .pki, Ci, k). Output invalid
if any of the check outputs 0.
• Compute σMS , τ , pkS by SE .Deck(E).
• Output invalid if τ = H(pkS , pkV1 , C1, . . . , pkVn , Cn,m).• Parse pkS as (MS.pkS ,WE .pkS).
• Invoke valid/ invalid ← MS.Verify( MS.pkS , σMS , {MS.pk1, . . .,
MS.pkn}, m||τ , MS.skV ).
Regarding the security of our generic construction, we have the following
theorem, whose proof shall appear in the full version of the paper due to page
limitation.
Theorem 2. Our generic construction satisfies definition d if the underlying
MDVS scheme MS satisfies definitions d for d ∈ {3, 4, 6}. Furthermore, our
generic construction satisfies definition 5 if WE is one-way secure in the random
oracle model.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we formalized the security notion unforgeability under rogue key
attack for MDVS. We proposed an efficient construction that is provably secure
in the proposed model. In addition, we present a generic transformation that
converts any secure MDVS scheme into a strong MDVS scheme. We leave the
construction of constant size strong MDVS scheme secure under our definitions
as an open problem.
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